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Abstract 
 
 
Using an experiment we investigate the effect of different centralised punishment mechanisms 
on deception and beliefs about deception in a principal-agent interaction that resembles many 
everyday expert advisor - client relationships. Agents have private information to transmit to 
Principals who must decide whether to follow Agent advice. Across our treatments, Agents 
face a range of expected penalties for deceptive behaviour with varying severity and monitoring 
probability. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the principal-agent interaction predicts penalties 
to have no effect on Agent behaviour. We find the magnitude of penalties to have important 
deterrent effects on deceptive Agent behaviour while Agents do not respond to changes in 
monitoring probabilities. Principal following behaviour increases in response to high penalties. 
However, it is unaffected by equivalent increases in monitoring. To help us understand the 
mechanism through which penalties deter deceptive behaviour, we test whether framing 
activates norms, providing an additional deterrence effect. We find norms are only activated 
by large penalties, providing a possible explanation for the impact of penalties on deceptive 
behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
The increasing complexity of many tasks and the specialisation required in completing these 
tasks leads people to often engage experts for advice and assistance. For example, individuals 
routinely engage experts for financial advice on saving for retirement; experts provide 
assistance when applying for home and other loans and in the preparation of tax returns; experts 
are typically engaged when repairing our homes, home appliances and vehicles; and when we 
are ill we seek medical treatment from medical experts.1 Given the information asymmetry in 
such relationships, a common challenge is to minimise the chances of deceptive conduct by 
expert advisors and the accompanying costs to society. In this paper, we use an experiment to 
study the effects of uncertain punishment on deceptive behaviour in an asymmetric expert 
advisor-client relationships. We focus on the trade-off between punishment severity and 
detection probability, comparing explanations of deception and following based on Becker’s 
deterrence hypothesis as well as models of behavioural norms. 
 
Deceptive behaviour in expert advisor-client relationships has been an increasingly important 
policy issue due to its economic consequences. In recent research on medical over servicing, 
Schwartz et al. (2014) find between 25% and 42% of US Medicare patients are provided some 
care of little or no benefit with a total cost of between $1.9 billion and $8.5 billion in 2009. 
This involves agents (health service providers) behaving opportunistically when providing 
advice and services to uninformed principals (patients).2  
 
Another recent example involves the packaging of risky home loans into residential mortgage 
backed securities (RMBS) in the lead up to the global financial crisis (GFC). Many of these 
loans did not comply with regulatory guidelines and were not appropriate for securitization. 
However, the resulting RMBS were misrepresented by banks (expert advisors) as high quality 
to investors, contributing to the GFC of 2008. Two of the major banks involved, JPMorgan and 
Bank of America, have agreed to record $13 billion and $16.65 Billion settlements 
respectively. These bank’s admissions include “misleading investors about securities 
                                                          
1 Even experts seek the advice of those more specialised than themselves, for example investment decisions of 
professional portfolio managers depend on the decisions and advice of ratings agencies and general medical 
practitioners seek advice from and refer complex patients on to specialists. 
2 It is however complicated by the role of insurance and the fact that patients often do not pay directly for medical 
treatment. Where health care is provided through full or partial insurance, the Principal may be thought of as the 
insurer. The patient’s interests may also align with those of the insurer in that they do not wish to undergo un-
necessary treatments. 
  
 
2 
containing toxic mortgages” and “and failing to disclose key facts about the quality of 
securitized loans to investors, including misrepresentations to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and 
the Federal Housing Administration”; for more details see Department of Justice (2013, 2014).  
Another important factor leading to the GFC is the deceptive behaviour of lenders when signing 
up home loan borrowers by not fully evaluating or potentially misleading borrowers about their 
capacity to meet repayments over the life of their loans.  In both cases, clients sought advice 
and services from experts and were often deceived, despite the existence of regulations 
(including penalties), costing society many tens of billions of dollars. The policy response has 
been the introduction of new laws and regulations governing the behaviour of financial 
institutions in these types of interactions through the Dodd-Frank act, 2010.3  
 
Given the economic significance and diversity of applications, much work has been undertaken 
in the economics literature to design and study the efficacy of regulatory mechanisms, 
including penalties; see Pollinsky and Shavell (2007) for a review of this literature. A key 
insight from theoretical models is that with uncertain monitoring, greater expected penalties 
reduce the incidence of crime. Assuming agents are on average risk averse, the deterrent effect 
of increased penalty severity has been shown to be stronger than equivalent increases in 
monitoring (Becker, 1968). Recent experimental literature corroborates the first part of these 
findings, see for example Harbaugh et al. (2013) and Khadjavi (2015), with Friesen (2012) 
providing evidence of the latter; these studies all focus on non-strategic non-interactive 
contexts. 
 
This literature has yet to examine the impact of uncertain penalties on deceptive behaviour in 
the strategic expert advisor-client relationships we study here. In this strategic context, Agent 
(or advisor) payoffs are not only dependent on their actions, but also on the actions of the 
principal (or client). While penalties decrease the expected monetary returns to opportunistic 
advisor behaviour, it also serves to reassure the client that an advisor will behave honestly, 
increasing their susceptibility to opportunistic behaviour. Aware of this latter effect, any 
deterrence due to penalties will be moderated in equilibrium by a more trusting clientele.4 This 
can perhaps explain why, despite the existence of regulations and penalties in these expert 
advisor-client relationships, and a diverse range of approaches to understanding the 
                                                          
3 The act simplified disclosure requirements and strengthened penalties for non-disclosure. 
4 These equilibrium effects are highlighted in Gneezy and Rustichini (2004). 
  
 
3 
implications of penalties, we continue to see experts behave opportunistically and in violation 
of regulations with accompanying penalties.  
 
In this paper, we use an experiment to study how expert advisors and clients respond to 
penalties in a stylised principal agent model with information asymmetry. In this setting, expert 
advisors are the Agents who have private information about the state of the world and are 
required to signal this information to clients, who are the Principals. By sending deceptive 
signals Agents can potentially improve their own payoffs in the bad state. Principals are aware 
of these incentives and must decide whether to follow the signals provided. The experiment 
builds on the Sender-Receiver deception game of Gneezy (2005) but differs in three important 
ways: (i) unlike Gneezy (2005), we examine the impact of penalties on deceptive behaviour; 
(ii) Principals have full payoff information and as a consequence, the message sent by Agents 
is not cheap talk but is informative, albeit uncertain; and (iii) our choice of payoffs ensure that 
Agents do not have the incentive to engage in sophisticated deception, which Sutter (2009) has 
highlighted as one of the motivations for Sender behaviour in Gneezy (2005). 
 
In this experimental setup, we analyse the effect of introducing a centralised punishment 
mechanism and systematically varying the severity and probability of enforcement of penalties 
on both Principal and Agent behaviour and beliefs. In all punishment conditions, the penalty 
for deceptive behaviour is directed at the Agent.  Given this design, we characterise the 
Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) for treatments with and without penalties. The model predicts 
that the introduction of penalties: (i) has no effect on Agent behaviour, explained by a crowding 
out of the deterrent effect of penalties by increased Agent beliefs of Principal following; and 
(ii) increased Principal following as expected penalties increase. 
 
Contrary to these predictions, we find in our experiment that penalties deter Agent deception 
conditional on the penalty being of large magnitude. Treatments with large penalties have the 
strongest deterrence leading to a 50% reduction in deception compared to the condition without 
penalties. An equivalent small certain penalty has no effect on Agent deception. We also find 
increasing the probability of enforcement does not have any additional deterrence effect, even 
in the presence of large penalties. On the other hand, Principal behaviour is partially consistent 
with the BNE predictions. Larger penalties increase following rates irrespective of the 
probability of punishment. However, Principals do not respond to expected penalties as 
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predicted; a small certain penalty did not affect Principal behaviour relative to the control 
treatment while a large penalty with the same expected value induced greater following.  
 
In a strategic setting beliefs are important and may explain behaviour, particularly Agent 
responses to penalties. Our experimental design collects information on the beliefs of Principals 
and Agents. Contrary to expectations, we find with small expected penalties Agent beliefs 
about Principal following rates are not impacted by our punishment mechanisms. If Agents do 
not update their beliefs about Principal following, the introduction of penalties may have a 
deterrent effect on deceptive behaviour. This explanation breaks down for the case of high 
expected penalties where Agent beliefs about following rates are higher but we observe lower 
deception rates than in the control.  
 
An alternative explanation for behaviour not account by the BNE model is the impact of norms 
on behaviour. As argued by Elster (2009) among others, norms are important in explaining 
behaviour as actions that violate norms are psychologically costly. Individuals trade-off these 
costs with material benefits when making choices involving deceptive behaviour; Gibson et al. 
(2013). Penalties not only affect material benefits of an action, but also influence the 
psychological costs associated with that action. Penalties, in principle, can signal to individuals 
that an action is undesirable (Benabou and Tirole, 2006) by activating or increasing the saliency 
of norms (Cialdini et al., 1990), (Krupka and Weber (2009, 2013). Conversely, penalties may 
serve as a price and if set very low can reduce the psychological costs associated with the 
undesirable behaviour (Gneezy et al., 2011). Despite the importance of norms on penalties, and 
the role of penalties in deceptive behaviour, the literature is silent on how norms influence 
deception with varying penalties.  To test this formally, we implement two additional 
treatments where we vary the material payoffs of deceptive behaviour without introducing the 
additional psychological costs associated with a penalty.  We provide novel evidence that 
deceptive behaviour is reduced by the introduction of psychological costs only in the presence 
of large but not small penalties. We then show that these psychological costs explain up to two-
thirds of the total effect of penalties on deception. This implies that framing of a penalty has 
additional deterrence effects that may be unaccounted for in the theoretical and policy 
literature.  
 
Our work adds to the literature in a number of important ways. First, we bring together the 
literature analysing deception in experiments in strategic contexts (Gneezy, 2005, Sutter, 2009) 
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with the experimental literature testing the deterrence effects of uncertain penalties on stealing 
and cheating; Nagin and Pogersky (2003), Friesen (2012), Harbaugh et al. (2013) and Khadjavi 
(2015).5 Unlike these separate literatures, participants in our experiments interact strategically 
and face uncertain penalties. As suggested by earlier examples, strategic interactions are 
common in practice and differ from the non-strategic settings more commonly studied in the 
literature. In strategic contexts, subjects will be influenced by beliefs about the uncertain 
behaviour of their interacting partner. We design an experiment to measure deception in this 
setting while accounting for beliefs. Second, we add to the literature on crime and punishment 
(Becker, 1968) by building our knowledge of how deterrence mechanisms influence behaviour.  
While others have shown the relative effectiveness of penalty severity over equivalent 
increases in monitoring in reducing socially undesirable behaviour (Friesen, 2012, Anderson 
and Stafford, 2003), we test whether norms can explain changes in behaviour upon the 
introduction of a penalty. That is, if penalties reduce deception through an increase in the 
salience of norms. We thereby add to the literature on the effect of social and ethical norms on 
behaviour (Krupka and Weber, 2009, 2013).  
2. Theory and experimental design 
We use a principal agent signalling game to examine the effects of severity of sanctions and 
the probability of enforcement on behaviour. We simulate an environment in which Player 1 
(the Agent) observes the state of nature while Player 2 (the Principal) does not. The Agent then 
either reveals the true state of nature or sends a deceptive signal to the Principal. The Principal 
must decide whether to follow the signal provided by the Agent, aware that it could be 
deceptive and the range of potential payoffs. We consider four treatments with all treatments 
comprising these key characteristics. The key differences between treatments are the possibility 
of centrally administered punishment of the Agent for deceptive signalling, explained below. 
 
Our experimental design builds on the experimental mechanism of Gneezy (2005) where the 
Receiver (Principals in our setting) can choose to follow the Sender’s (Agents in our setting) 
signal. However, our design differs from Gneezy (2005) as the Principal has full payoff 
                                                          
5 Other studies have investigated the effects of external punishment in reducing corruption (Abbink et al. 2002), 
collusion (Block and Gerety, 1995) and roadway speeding (DeAngelo and Charness, 2012).  In a non-regulatory 
setting, i.e. public goods games with peer punishment, the introduction of such institutions improves cooperation 
(Fehr and Gachter, 2000, Leibbrandt and Lopez, 2011). The efficacy of these institutions is strongly influenced 
by how they are selected (Tyrian and Feld, 2006).  Peeters et al. (2013) also show the importance of selection of 
punishment institutions on behaviour in Sender – Receiver deception games. These studies do not investigate an 
expert advisor – client asymmetric environment that we study here.  
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information and as a consequence, the message sent by Agents is not cheap talk but rather 
contains some information, albeit uncertain. Further, our choice of payoffs ensure that Agents 
do not have the incentive to engage in sophisticated deception. 
2.1 Interaction without punishment 
First, the state of nature (N) is randomly determined as Good (G) with 25% probability and 
Bad (B) otherwise.6 The Agent observes N and provides a signal about the state to the Principal. 
This signal may or may not be the true state of nature. Upon receiving a signal that the state is 
Good, the Principal assigns a probability of q to the likelihood of the state of nature being Good 
and (1-q) to the likelihood it is Bad. Analogously, after receiving a signal of a Bad state, the 
Principal assigns a probability of p to the likelihood of the state of nature being Bad and (1-p) 
to the likelihood it is Good. The Principal then chooses to follow (F) or not follow (NF) the 
Agent’s signal. The Principal’s optimal strategy is to follow when the Agent sends a truthful 
signal and conversely, it is optimal to not follow when the Agent misreports the state of nature. 
The game tree with payoffs is shown in Figure 1, where Z is the penalty for sending a deceptive 
signal and 𝛼 is the probability of the penalty being enforced; these features are discussed further 
below. 
 
Payoffs were selected to ensure the following criteria are observed: 
(i) The payoff to both the Principal and Agent are highest when the state of nature is Good, 
the Agent truthfully reports this state and the Principal follows. 
(ii) The Principal should always be at least as well off, if not better off, following a signal if it 
is truthful than following the same signal when it is deceptive. This implies principals must 
be wary of the truthfulness of Agent claims in signals; i.e. being deceived hurts the 
Principal.7 
(iii) Given the state, Agent payoffs are lower if they deceive and are not followed than if they 
tell the truth and are followed. The idea behind such payoff differences is the Principal 
discovers the signal was deceptive and the Agent justifiably loses credibility. 
(iv) Agents sending truthful signals are never better off when Principals do not follow such 
truthful signals. This ensures that Agents have no incentive to engage in sophisticated 
                                                          
6 We use the neutral frame, state A and B in the instructions. Strictly speaking, state A in the game tree in Figure 
1 is always a good state only for the Principal; i.e. state A is always weakly preferred by the Principal. 
7 In our game, see Figure 1, following a Bad signal offers the same Principal payoff whether it is true or false, as 
following such a signal is treated as a baseline or defensive strategy; e.g. in a financial advisor – investor setting, 
choosing to not invest when the state is Good or Bad preserves the investor’s (Principal’s) capital. 
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deception (Sutter, 2009) where they report truthfully, with the expectation that Principals 
will not follow. 
 
An extensive set of possible payoffs would satisfy these criteria. Those shown in Figure 1, with 
Z = 0, provide a simple set of satisfactory payoffs. 
 
Assuming participants are sophisticated and risk neutral we can identify multiple sequentially 
rational Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. While there is no separating equilibrium for this game, 
we can identify a pooling equilibrium at (B B, NF F; 0.25, 0.75).8 As this equilibrium implies 
the Principal places no value on the signal received, i.e. cheap talk, we discount it from further 
consideration. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
Instead, we consider mixed strategy equilibria.9 The Agent’s weakly dominant strategy in state 
G is to signal G. We thus focus on equilibria where the Agent plays this weakly dominant 
strategy in state G but randomises between a signal of G or B in state B. The Principal will thus 
know with certainty the state is B when a signal of B is observed, setting p = 1. For the Agent 
at 1B to randomise between a signal of G or B, the Principal at 2G must randomise between 
actions F and NF to the point of indifference between these actions. The expected value of 
following, F, which is (70×𝑞), must equal the expected value of not following, NF, which is 
30, based on payoffs in Figure 1. The Principal is therefore expected to form the belief 𝑞 =
3/7. We use Bayes’ theorem to compute the probability the Agent signals G at node 1B, 
denoted as x. It is shown in Appendix A that 𝑞 = 3/7 only if 𝑥 = 4/9. Finally, the Agent must 
be indifferent between signalling G or B in order to employ such a mixed strategy. Allowing y 
to denote the probability the Principal chooses F at 2G, it is also shown in Appendix A that the 
Agent is indifferent between the two signals at 1B when 𝑦 = 1/5.  
We can characterise a mixed strategy equilibrium with (i) the Agent signalling G with certainty 
at 1G and with probability 4/9 at 1B; and (ii) the Principal choosing F with probability 1/5 at 
2G and always choosing F at 2B. The Principal’s beliefs are 𝑞 = 3/7  and 𝑝 = 1. We refer to 
this version of the experiment, where there is no punishment mechanism, or Z = 0, as the control 
treatment. We now turn to characterising various punishment treatments. 
                                                          
8 Equilibria are expressed in terms of the strategy at nodes (1A 1B, 2A 2B) and beliefs (q, p); see Figure 1. 
9 We use the terms mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium, Bayesian mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium and Bayesian 
Nash Equilibrium interchangeably. 
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2.2 Introducing a punishment mechanism  
We build on the experiment described in Section 2.1 by introducing a punishment mechanism 
for deception by the Agent. In the high penalty high enforcement (HPHE) treatment, a penalty 
of Z=50 is imposed with probability 𝛼 = 0.50, should the Agent send an untrue signal of the 
state of nature and the principal follows. In the high penalty low enforcement (HPLE) 
treatment, the same penalty of Z=50 is imposed with probability 𝛼 = 0.10. In the low penalty 
high enforcement treatment (LPHE), a smaller fine of Z = 5 is imposed with certainty, 𝛼 = 1.  
The game tree for the HPHE and HPLE treatments are shown in Figure 2 for our control and 
punishment treatments are shown in Appendix B, Tables A1-A4. There are no separating or 
pooling equilibria for this game. As the Agent’s dominant strategy at node 1G is to signal G, 
we continue to focus on mixed strategy equilibria where the Agent plays this dominant strategy 
at 1G. The Principal must again be indifferent between the F and NF actions at 2G requiring 
that 𝑞 = 3/7 thus, the Principal’s payoffs are unaffected by the penalty. Again, this belief is 
only consistent if the probability of the Agent choosing G at 1B is 𝑥 = 4/9. 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
Thus, the only difference between the HPHE and HPLE equilibria and the control treatment 
mixed strategy equilibrium is, y, the probability the Principal chooses F at 2G. Assuming risk 
neutral Agents and given the expected penalty is 𝑃 = 𝛼𝑍, we find 𝑦 =
10
50−𝛼𝑍
 , which is derived 
in Appendix A. For the HPHE treatment, 𝑍 = 50 and 𝛼 = 0.50, so we have 𝑦 = 2 5⁄ , while in 
the HPLE treatment, 𝑍 = 50 and 𝛼 = 0.10, so 𝑦 = 2 9⁄ . 
Setting Z = 5 in Figure 1 provides the LPHE game tree with payoffs. Maintaining the 
assumption of Agent risk neutrality, the LPHE mixed strategy equilibrium is identical to that 
of the HPLE equilibrium as the expected penalty is identical. The equilibrium is characterised 
as (i) the Agent always signalling G at 1G and signalling G with probability 4/9 at 1B; and (ii) 
the Principal choosing F with probability 2/9 at 2G and always choosing F at 2B. The 
Principal’s beliefs are 𝑞 = 3/7 and 𝑝 = 1.  
The counterintuitive result that the introduction of penalties on Agents changes Principal 
behaviour but has no impact on Agent behaviour is a common feature of Bayesian mixed 
strategy Nash equilibria. It is due to the fact that Agent’s equilibrium behaviour is determined 
solely by the Principal’s payoffs, which in our case do not change with the introduction of 
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penalties. At an intuitive level, we can think of the penalty having two opposing effects in this 
strategic setting. The first being the conventionally anticipated deterrent effect on deceptive 
behaviour by the agent, while the second is the reassurance provided by the penalty to the 
Principal that the Agent is more likely to behave honestly, thereby inducing the Agent to behave 
dishonestly. These opposing effects perfectly crowd out each other in our Bayesian mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium, leading the penalty to have no effect on deceptive behaviour. These 
types of unexpected outcomes of punishments on behaviour in game theoretic settings are 
highlighted in Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) and in Tsebelis (1989) who concludes in a 
strategic setting that a penalty has no impact on crime. 
2.3. Hypotheses 
It is important to note that we do not discuss Agent behaviour when the true state of the world 
is G, since there is no incentive for Agents to be deceptive and send signal B. Further, since 
sending a signal B when the state of the world is G is a weakly dominated strategy for Agents, 
Principals should always follow a B signal, for this reason we also do not discuss Principal 
behaviour when they receive a B signal. However, for completeness, we discuss these more 
trivial cases in Appendix C.  
 
Following the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium discussed in Section 2.2 we offer the following 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis A1: At node 1B, a large fraction (4/9) of Agents will send deceptive signals about 
the state of the world in all treatments. 
Hypothesis A2: The introduction of a punishment mechanism will have no impact on the 
number of Agents sending deceptive signals at node 1B, with no variation across the three 
punishment treatments. 
The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium predicts that higher expected penalties for deceptive 
behaviour should increase the rate of following among Principals as the probability of 
following is 𝑦 =
10
50−𝛼𝑍
 , i.e. the following probability rises with the expected penalty 𝛼𝑍 until 
𝛼𝑍 = 40; the principal should follow with certainty for expected penalties greater than 40, 
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however all expected penalties in our experiments are less than 40.10 This presents us with two 
hypotheses regarding Principal behaviour and beliefs when observing a signal G. 
Hypothesis P1: Compared to the control treatment, following at node 2G will be higher in the 
punishment treatments, being higher and equal in the LPHE and HPLE treatments and highest 
in the HPHE treatment; 
Since Principal following probabilities are based on their beliefs about Agent truthfulness: 
Hypothesis P2: Principal beliefs about receiving a deceptive signal when the state is G will be 
highest with the control treatment. Beliefs will be lower and equal in the LPHE and HPLE 
treatments and lowest in the HPHE treatment. 
Given hypotheses P1 and P2, we have the following hypothesis regarding Agent beliefs about 
the following behaviour of Principals.  
Hypothesis A3: Agent beliefs about the following rate of Principals receiving signal G will 
increase as expected penalties from deceptive behaviour increase at node 1B. 
2.4 Risk preference Task 
Given that Principals are uncertain of the truthfulness of Agent signals and two of our 
treatments involve uncertain punishments, risk attitudes may play an important part in the 
behaviour of Principals and Agents. In order to elicit risk preferences we implement a risk 
game introduced by Eckel and Grossman (2002) as the final task. Participants had the 
opportunity to select one payoff option from a number of possibilities; see Table A7 in 
Appendix B. All payoff options had a high and a low payoff outcome, each with equal 
probability. At the end of the experiment a coin was tossed to decide the payoff. Participants 
are attracted to higher numbered game options if they are more risk tolerant. The elicited risk 
attitudes are used to test the robustness of player behaviour to these otherwise unobserved risk 
attitudes. 
                                                          
10 In the foundational theoretical literature, Becker (1968) shows that risk preferences can influence how 
individuals are deterred by an expected fine with differing severity and probability; see Friesen (2013) for a 
discussion in an experimental setting. For risk-neutral individuals, the severity and probability trade-off does not 
matter. For risk-averse individuals, increases in severity will have a larger effect and for risk-loving agents, 
increases in probability will have a larger effect. We control for risk preferences as part of our robustness checks 
in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
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2.5. Experimental procedures 
The experiment was conducted at Monash University’s Laboratory for Experimental 
Economics (MonLEE) using the experimental program z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
Participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). In total we ran 8 sessions with 160 
participants, of which half were randomly assigned as Agents and half as Principals. All 
participants played three rounds, where each round was a separate treatment. This partially 
within subject design was utilised to reduce the influence of individual level heterogeneity on 
behaviour. Each participant, in the first round played in the control condition. In the second 
round the participants either played the HPLE treatment (n = 84) or the HPHE treatment (n = 
76) while in the final round all participants played the LPHE treatment. After completing the 
third round all subjects participated in the risk experiment. The points that subjects earn during 
the experiment are converted to Australian dollars at the end of the experiment with an 
exchange rate of 5 points to $1 (Australian dollar or AUD). Along with a $5(AUD) turn up fee, 
participants were paid for one of the three rounds, which was chosen randomly in addition to 
the risk experiment. Each session lasted an hour with the average participant earning 
$21(AUD). 
All subjects received written instructions (attached in Appendix D)11 that were read aloud to 
establish common knowledge. Instructions for the subsequent tasks were only provided once 
the previous task was completed. Understanding of the rules was assured by a set of control 
questions that subjects were required to complete prior to making decisions. Answers to these 
questions were verified and the decision-making did not commence until all subjects indicated 
that they understood the instructions. 
All responses were solicited using the strategy method. More specifically, all Agents were 
asked if the actual state of the world was G, what state of the world would you inform Player 
2? And on the same screen were asked the same question but if the state of the world was B. 
Similarly, Principals were asked for both signals G and B-- if Player 1 signalled state G (B), 
would you follow or not follow? We implemented a stranger matching design, so that subjects 
were randomly rematched every round. All participants understood that they were to be 
randomly matched at the start of each round.  In order to avoid experiences from past rounds 
                                                          
11 We provide the instructions for the control, HPLE and LPHE version of the experiment. Other treatments are 
available on request.  
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influencing behaviour, there was no feedback provided to subjects between rounds, reducing 
confounding impacts of beliefs being updated between rounds and driving behaviour. 
In addition to actual decisions of subjects, we also collected information on beliefs about their 
partner’s choice. In order to capture beliefs we used incentivised survey questions after subjects 
made their decisions in each round. Specifically, Agents were asked to predict the percentage 
of Principals that would follow (F) if they received signal G and if they received signal B. 
Similarly, Principals were asked to predict the percentage of the Agents that misreported the 
state of the world when the true state was G and when it was B; i.e. Agents sent signal G (B) 
when the state was B (G). Participants were paid 10 experimental dollars if their prediction was 
within 10% of the actual behaviour of participants in their respective sessions. We also 
collected information on basic demographics and socio-economic status and choice of studies 
at university with a post-experiment survey. 
 
 
2.6 Norms based experiments 
To further understand the impact of penalties on behaviour, we consider theories of behavioural 
norms as an alternative explanation. While the introduction of penalties may not change the 
economic incentives of Agents, it can change the framing of a decision task and activate or 
increase the focus of norms that can affect behaviour; see for example (Krupka and Weber, 
2009, 2013) and (Cialdini et al., 1990). In this case, norms could lead to lower levels of 
deception by: (i) signalling to Agents that deceptive behaviour is undesirable; and (ii) 
increasing the psychological costs of deception. Conversely, the introduction of penalties may 
increase deception because a punishment mechanism might serve to value the norm, reducing 
intrinsic motivation for adherence. This will occur if the size of the penalty is smaller than the 
psychological cost of deviating from the norm, thus lowering the value and psychological cost 
of deception (Gneezy et al. 2011). This is similar to the finding of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) 
who show that penalties for late pick-up in a child care centre raised the incidence of late pick-
ups rather than reducing it. 
We hypothesise norms may influence Hypothesis A2. The punishment mechanisms in these 
treatments may activate (or increase the salience of) norms that reduce deceptive signalling. 
The simplest possibility is that all penalties (irrespective of size) activate (or increase the 
salience of) norms in the same way, reducing deception relative to the control treatment, with 
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no variation in deceptive behaviour due to differences in penalty magnitudes and probabilities 
of enforcement across punishment treatments.  
However, the type of punishment mechanism may provide more nuanced information to 
Agents, with the salience of norms depending on the size or enforcement of the penalty. For 
example, expected penalties may affect salience monotonically, i.e. the higher the expected 
penalty the higher the salience of the norm. If this is the case, deception will be greatest in the 
control treatment, followed by the LPHE and HPLE treatments (due to identical expected 
penalties), with the lowest levels of deception in the HPHE treatment. Along similar lines, if 
the probability of the enforcement of a penalty determines norm salience, we expect deception 
to be highest in the control treatment and to be progressively lower in the HPLE, HPHE and 
LPHE treatments respectively. 
 
To test the impact of norms, we collect data from a second experiment. This experiment is 
similar to the first but contains two new treatments where we alter the payoffs of our original 
control treatment. We implemented 4 sessions resulting in 66 participants. In the first additional 
treatment, which we label Min-5, we modify the original control treatment by reducing Agent 
payoffs from deception and being followed by 5 experimental dollars.  The expected payoffs 
from this treatment are identical to LPHE and HPLE treatments, The key difference is that like 
the control, subjects are not informed that deceiving is accompanied by a penalty (see Appendix 
B Table A5). We can thus compare this treatment to LPHE and HPLE treatments to identify if 
using a penalty frame changes behaviour and to identify the impact of the size of a penalty on 
norms made salient through the frame. The second treatment, Min-25 is like Min-5 except we 
reduce Agents payoff from deceiving and being followed by 25 experimental dollars (see 
Appendix B Table A6). Expected payoffs are equivalent to the HPHE treatment with the 
exception that we do not use the term penalty. We compare this treatment to HPHE to identify 
the influence of norms activated through the penalty frame.  
Like our first experiment, all participants played three different treatments. Subjects 
participated in Min-5 and Min-25 followed by LPHE in the third round.  The rationale for 
including LPHE in the final round is to check the robustness of the effect of our experiment 1 
LPHE treatment on behaviour.   In the first experiment, the LPHE treatment was always played 
in the 3rd round and was preceded by a treatment where high penalties were introduced. If 
norms were made salient by these high penalty treatments, then it might have spilled over to 
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the LPHE treatment. In experiment 2, as LPHE treatment is not preceded by a treatment where 
the penalty is made salient, this spill over should not exist. Finally, all other protocols for the 
second experiment was the same as Experiment 1. 
3. Results 
In this section, we begin by examining the signal transmitted by the Agent and Agent’s beliefs 
about the behaviour of Principals. Following this we investigate the response of Principals to 
signals received and their beliefs about the proportion of agents that misreport. 
3.1 The effects of punishment mechanisms on Agent behaviour. 
The behaviour of Agents across all treatments is presented in Table 1 and the difference 
estimates across treatments are presented in Panel A, Table 2. 
 
When the state of the world is B, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium predicts that 4/9 of 
signals will be deceptive in the control treatment. In this treatment we find that Agent deception 
is much higher at 59% (p = 0.01; Wilcoxon Signed-rank). Deception decreases across both 
high penalty treatments. Agents send deceptive signals 24% of the time in the HPHE, and 29% 
of the time in the HPLE treatment. In both cases, deception rates are statistically different from 
the control treatment (p < 0.01; Mann-Whitney).12 There is no statistically significant 
difference in deception between the control and LPHE treatments (p = 0.27).  It follows that 
the HPLE and HPHE treatments have significantly lower rates of deception than the LPHE 
treatment (p < 0.05). 
[Table 1 and Table 2 around here] 
Given the expected penalties for the LPHE and HPLE treatments are identical, these results 
imply that raising the severity of the penalty has a larger deterrent effect on deceptive behaviour 
than an equivalent increase in the probability of enforcement. This is further supported by the 
fact that the rates of deception are not statistically different between HPHE and HPLE 
treatments (p = 0.8), implying that in the presence of high penalties, increasing enforcement 
probability, from 0.1 to 0.5, has little impact on deceptive behaviour. These findings reject both 
Hypothesis A1 and A2 and are summarised in the following results. 
                                                          
12 Unless stated otherwise, we report p-values for two-tailed Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon tests. In Appendix D we 
provide p-values for two tailed t-tests as a robustness check. 
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Result A1: When the state of the world is Bad, with no punishment mechanism in place, a 
majority (more than the predicted 4/9) of Agents send deceptive signals about the state of the 
world. This deception is not constant across treatments. 
Result A2: The punishment treatments reduce the rate of deception conditional on the penalty 
being of large magnitude. A higher probability of punishment in the presence of large penalties 
has no additional deterrent effect. 
Agent beliefs about Principal following rates are shown also documented in Table 1 and  
differences in beliefs across treatments are shown in Panel A, Table 2. On average, Agents 
believe that 52% of Principals will follow a signal G in the control treatment. Under the HPHE 
treatment, Agent beliefs increase to 60%, which is significantly higher than the control (p = 
0.06). There are no statistical differences between Agent beliefs in the control, HPLE and 
LPHE treatments (p > 0.33 for all pairwise tests). A Kruskal-Wallis test of equality of means 
of beliefs across the treatments (experiment 1) is also statistically insignificant (p = 0.25). We 
thus do not find support for Hypothesis A3. 
Result A3: Agent beliefs of Principal following rates of a G signal are unaffected by our 
punishment treatments when the expected penalty is low.  
Agent beliefs are quite close to the actual following behaviour of Principals in the control 
treatment and LPHE treatments, where the following rate is 49% (p = 0.7, Wilcoxon Signed-
rank) and 56% (p = 0.21; Wilcoxon Signed-rank) respectively;  Panel A, Table 2. In the 
presence of large penalties, Agents systematically underestimate Principal following rates. In 
the HPHE treatment the following rate is 71%, which is significantly greater than the 60% 
predicted by Agents (p < 0.01; Wilcoxon Signed-rank). Similarly, the following rate for the 
HPLE treatment is 69%, which also exceeds Agents’ beliefs of 55% (p < 0.01; Wilcoxon 
Signed-rank). These findings, which relate Agent beliefs to Principal following rates when 
sending a signal G are summarised in the following result. 
Result A4: When facing no punishment or punishments of small magnitude, Agents accurately 
predict the behaviour of Principals facing a signal of G. In the presence of large penalties, 
Agents underestimate the rate of Principal following of a signal G. 
Behaviour displayed in the experiment may be driven by an individual’s risk preferences. In 
order to isolate the treatment effect and to confirm the robustness of our previous results we 
undertake an econometric analysis, controlling for risk preferences elicited from the Eckel and 
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Grossman (2002) risk task, along with other individual characteristics. In columns (1) and (2) 
of Table 3, we present OLS estimates for a model of Agent behaviour in states G and B 
respectively. The explanatory variables include dummies for treatments and a dummy if the 
subject is risk averse.13 We also control for individual heterogeneity. These estimates show that 
after controlling for risk and individual characteristics our results are robust and consistent with 
those found in our non-parametric analysis.  
[Table 3 around here] 
3.2 Principal responses to punishment mechanisms 
Principal behaviour is reported in Table 1 and tests for differences in behaviour across 
treatments are reported in Panel A, Table 2. In the case of signal G, the following rate was 49% 
in the control. This is significantly higher than the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, which 
predicts 20% following (p < 0.01, Wilcoxon Signed-rank). In the HPHE and HPLE treatments, 
following rates increase further to 71% and 69% respectively, both of which are statistically 
significantly higher than in the control (p < 0.05). The following rate in the LPHE treatment is 
7 percentage points higher than in the control but this difference is not statistically significant 
(p > 0.60). Our results suggest that the introduction of penalties only reassures principals if 
they are large, leading them to increase following behaviour. The marginal impact of increasing 
monitoring in the presence of severe penalties appears negligible when comparing the HPHE 
and HPLE treatments. These findings allow us to reject Hypothesis P1 and are summarised as 
follows. 
Result P1: When Principals receive signal G, following rates depend on the severity of the 
penalty. Following rates are higher when penalties are high and do not vary with the 
probability of punishment. Low but certain penalties do not induce higher following rates. 
Turning to Principal’s beliefs about deceptive signals when the actual state of the world is B. 
We find that in the control treatment, Principals believe that 60% of signals sent by Agents 
when the state of the world is B are deceptive; that is, Principals believe Agents send signal G 
when the true state is B. In both the HPHE and HPLE treatments, Principals believe Agent 
deception decreases to less than 40%, which was statistically different from both the control 
and LPHE treatments (p < 0.01; Mann-Whitney, two tailed). While the average belief about 
                                                          
13 Following Eckel and Grossman (2002), a subject is risk averse if they select an option less than 5; see Appendix 
B, Table A7. Since individuals play the control, HPHE or HPLE, and LPHE treatments, we are analysing the 
impact of risk preferences within each of the treatments and not across. 
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misreporting is lower in the LPHE (53.1%) compared to the control treatment, the difference 
is not statistically significant (p > 0.12; Mann-Whitney, two-tailed). There is also no statistical 
difference in Principal beliefs across HPHE and HPLE treatments (p > 0.62; Mann-Whitney, 
two-tailed). We thus reject Hypothesis P2, summarizing our results on Principal beliefs in the 
following result. 
Result P2: Principal beliefs about deception when the state is B depend on the severity of the 
punishment. A higher penalty decreases Principal’s beliefs that Agents will send a deceptive 
signal, however, a higher probability of punishment has little effect on beliefs. 
Principal beliefs about Agent actions are quite accurate in the absence of large penalties. In the 
control treatment and LPHE, the actual rate of deception was 59% and 50% while the 
corresponding beliefs were 60% (p > 0.4, Wilcoxon Signed-rank, two tailed) and 53.1% (p > 
0.2, Wilcoxon Signed-rank, two tailed) respectively. However, when the penalties imposed 
were large, Principals systematically over-estimated the probability of receiving deceptive 
signals by over 10 percent (p < 0.02, Wilcoxon Signed-Rank, two tailed, for both HPHE and 
HPLE treatments). These findings compare Principal beliefs to Agent deception rates, and are 
summarised in the following result. 
Result P3: When Agents face no punishment or punishment of small magnitudes, Principals 
accurately predict the rate of Agent deception. In the presence of large penalties, Principals 
overestimate the rate of Agent deception. 
As with Agent behaviour, we test the robustness of Principal behaviour to risk preferences and 
individual characteristics by estimating OLS regressions of Principal following behaviour. 
Results are presented for signals G and B respectively in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3. Our 
main results about Principal following behaviour are robust to the inclusion of individual level 
differences. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
In this subsection we summarise our main findings and relate them to the predictions from the 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium we have characterised.  When the true state of the world is Bad, we 
find the magnitude of penalties matters more than the magnitude of expected penalties for 
Agent signalling (Result A2). Agents reduce their deceptive behaviour in the presence of large 
potential penalties, irrespective of the probability of enforcement. This result is inconsistent 
with the predictions of constant rates of deception across all treatments. Key to explaining this 
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inconsistency is understanding the trade-offs that underlie the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
Intuitively, the drop in expected monetary benefits from deception should be counter balanced 
by changes in Agent beliefs about Principal following. A lack of evidence of the latter suggests 
that the drop in deception can be explained by changes in the expected penalty size. This is the 
prominent mechanism outlined in the traditional deterrence model. 
 
We find some support for this. The HPHE treatment, which has the highest expected penalty 
of 25 experimental dollars (ED), elicits significantly less deceptive behaviour than the control 
and LPHE treatments with expected penalties of 0 ED and 5 ED respectively. However, 
comparing the HPLE treatment with expected penalty of 5 ED to the HPHE and LPHE 
treatments shows different deception rates with identical expected penalties (HPLE vs LPHE) 
and identical deception rates with different expected penalties (HPHE vs HPLE). As a 
consequence we conclude that deterrence models that focus on expected penalties cannot fully 
explain the effect of penalties in our Principal-Agent setting. We offer an alternative 
explanation in the next section. 
 
Turning to Principals, results in Panel A, Table 2 show Principals faced with a potentially 
deceptive Good signal respond to large penalties. A significant difference in following 
behaviour is observed between the cases where fines are high (HPHE and HPLE) and the 
control and LPHE treatments. According to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, following 
should increase with expected penalty and we only find partial evidence for this – Principal 
following increases between the control and HPHE and HPLE. However, we also find that 
following is the same in (i) the HPHE and HPLE treatments; and (ii) the LPHE and control 
treatments. However, it is different across LPHE and HPLE, implying the model’s predictions 
are not in line with observed behaviour. In addition, we find that Principals believe that Agents 
will send fewer deceptive signals in the high penalty, HPHE and HPLE, treatments. This 
pattern of beliefs is consistent with the actual actions taken by Agents in that only high penalties 
are believed to be effective and is consistent with the norms explanation of behaviour offered 
below.  
 
3.4 Alternative explanations 
In this subsection we investigate an alternative norms based explanation outlined in Section 
2.6. Norms provide a set of rules that govern individual behaviour that can at times conflict 
  
 
19 
with incentives based on pecuniary interests. This is particularly true in the case of deceptive 
behaviour where pecuniary incentives may encourage deception, while norms often encourage 
honest behaviour due to the high social and moral cost of lying (Gibson et al, 2013). The impact 
of norms on behaviour is pertinent when decision tasks are framed in a way to induce moral 
behaviour by increasing the salience of these norms. 
 
We combine data from our norms based treatments with our data from experiment 1. Table 1 
and Panel B, Table 2 present results for the norm treatments Min-5 and Min-25, corresponding 
to LPHE/HPLE and HPHE expected payoffs respectively. Several important results are 
evident. First, when the penalties are large, framing punishment as a penalty appears to have 
an additional deterrence effect. We find that the HPLE treatment has a 20 percentage point 
lower rate of deception compared to Min-5 despite having the same expected payoffs (p = 
0.08). We also find a 10 percentage point difference between HPHE and Min-25, although it 
is not statistically significant (p > 0.4). If we were to decompose the total effect of penalties in 
the high penalty treatments between: i) the effect of deterrence due to pay-off decrease and ii) 
norm salience, we find that 2/3 and ¼ of the total effect in the HPLE and HPHE treatments 
respectively, can be explained by an increase in the salience of norms (Figure 3).14  
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
Second, in the Min-5 treatment, the Agent deception rate is identical to that in the low penalty 
treatment (LPHE) (p > 0.99). This implies that when the penalty is small, making norms salient 
has little additional deterrence effect. Note that the fine size in the LPHE treatment is 12.5% 
of the benefit of deception. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) highlight the pricing effect of fines: 
in this context this implies that the guilt from deception is priced and hence reduces the intrinsic 
motivation to send truthful signals. These results imply that the activation of norm saliency 
among Agents is not uniform across penalties but rather depends on the size of the penalty. 
 
Similar to the behaviour of Agents, Principals are also influenced by the saliency of norms, but 
again only when penalties are large. We find that following rate is 30 percentage points higher 
in HPLE compared to Min-5 (p = 0.01) and 24 percentage points higher in HPHE compared to 
                                                          
14 The total effect for HPLE (HPHE) is calculated by comparing the means between control and HPLE (HPHE) 
treatments. The effect of the payoff is calculated by comparing the means between control and Min-5 (Min-25). 
The difference between the total effect and the effect of the payoff is the effect based on norm saliency.  
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Min-25 (p = 0.06). We find that 2/3 of the total effect in Principal behaviour in the HPLE 
treatment is driven by norm saliency. For HPHE, the entire deterrence effect is driven by norms. 
When the penalty is smaller, there is no additional effect of introducing a punishment 
mechanism: we find that the following rate is not statistically different between LPHE and 
Min-5 (p > 0.69). Principal behaviour is consistent with their beliefs. On average, Principals 
believe there will be lower rates of deception in the high penalty treatments: in HPHE relative 
to Min 25 (p = 0.00) and HPLE relative to Min-5 (p = 0.00). When penalties are small, beliefs 
about deception are not different between LPHE and Min-5 (p = 0.11). These results imply that 
the use of the term penalty, particularly when they penalties are large, increases the saliency of 
norms among Principals and induces higher following rates and beliefs that Agents will be 
honest. 
 
Since subjects in experiment 1 participate in multiple treatments prior to the LPHE treatment, 
norms made salient in earlier treatments may influence LPHE behaviour. The design of 
experiment 2, where penalty frames were not used prior to LPHE, allows us to test this impact. 
Comparing behaviour in LPHE experiment 1 and LPHE experiment 2 we find that for both 
Principals and Agents, the behaviour across the two experiments are similar (p > 0.88 for 
Agents, p > 0.29 for Principals, see Panel B, Table 2). This suggests that framing punishment 
as a penalty has a negligible spill over effects across treatments. 
 
To summarise, our results from experiment 2 suggest the increased psychological cost of 
deception induced by norm saliency plays an important role in the deterrence of deceptive 
behaviour and its perception. Clearly framing punishments as a penalty increases honesty but 
only when the penalty is appropriately large.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper examines deceptive behaviour in a stylised expert advisor-client relationship. Such 
relationships are common and include financial advisor-investor, doctor-patient or mechanic-
car owner. The inherent information asymmetry in these relationships provides scope for 
deceptive behaviour on the part of agents and as a consequence, regulatory schemes exist to 
deter and punish such behaviour. Our findings suggest that large penalties, even with low levels 
of monitoring are more likely than small certain penalties to be effective at deterring 
opportunistic behaviour and perceptions among clients of such behaviour. This deterrence is 
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not only driven by the potential losses associated with large fines when they are realised, but 
is also determined by increases in the saliency of norms due to framing punishment as a penalty. 
We find that a penalty frame produces an additional deterrence effect, but only when penalties 
are large. When penalties are smaller, this additional effect is not observed. 
 
Our results suggest that policy makers can utilise penalties to reduce deceptive behaviour. In 
our experiment we have demonstrated that large fines, in contrast to small fines, will achieve 
this. However, if large fines are accompanied with strong wording to emphasize (frame) the 
social and moral costs of deceptive actions, this deterrence effect should be stronger. While our 
experiment assumes that the criminal justice system is perfect in its enforcement, this might 
not be the case. In an imperfect system with reasonable doubt tests, Andreoni (1991) provide a 
theoretical model which show that large absolute fines can lead to increases in criminal 
behaviour if jurors are averse to convict. It would be worthwhile to examine whether behaviour 
is in line with the theoretical prediction in Andreoni, (1991) in light of the strong deterrence 
effect presented in our paper.  Finally, while large penalties deter deception, we do not test 
whether the ensuing lower rates of deception will persist once these fines are removed/reduced 
through the lowering of monitoring. This is an issue for future research. 
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Table 1: Mean Behaviour and Beliefs of Agents and Principals across treatments in Experiment 1 and 2. 
  Agent Principal 
Description Deception at Bad State 
Belief about Following of 
Good Signal 
Follow of Good Signal 
Belief about Deception when 
state is Bad 
Control 58.8 51.8 48.8 51.8 
HPHE 23.7 59.6 71.1 59.6 
HPLE 28.6 55.4 69.0 55.4 
LPHE_1 50.0 53.3 43.8 53.3 
Min_5 48.5 61.3 42.4 61.3 
Min_25 33.0 59.2 48.4 59.2 
LPHE_2 48.5 55.9 33.0 55.9 
         
  Agent Principal 
  Deception at Good State 
Belief about following of 
Bad Signal 
Follow of Bad Signal 
Belief about Misreport when 
state is Good 
Control 6.3 62.5 78.8 33.7 
HPHE 0.0 68.0 92.1 18.9 
HPLE 2.4 65.7 71.4 26.6 
LPHE_1 5.0 68.3 71.3 22.3 
Min_5 3.0 64.9 84.8 22.5 
Min_25 0.0 63.5 75.7 19.1 
LPHE_2 6.1 65.0 84.8 15.2 
Notes:LPHE_1 and LPHE_2 correspond to results from the LPHE treatment in Experiment 1 and 2 respectively. 
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Table 2: Treatment differences for behaviour and beliefs of Agents when in the Bad state and Principals upon receiving Good signal 
  Agent Principal 
Treatment Differences Deception at Bad State 
Belief about Following 
of Good Signal 
Follow of Good Signal 
Belief about Deception 
when state is Bad 
 Difference 
(1) 
p-value 
(2) 
Difference 
(3) 
p-value 
(4) 
Difference 
(5) 
p-value 
(6) 
Difference 
(7) 
p-value 
(8) 
Panel A: Experiment 1         
Control - HPHE 35.1 0.00*** -7.8 0.06* -22.3 0.02** -7.8 0.00*** 
Control - HPLE 30.2 0.00*** -3.5 0.33 -20.3 0.03** -3.5 0.00*** 
Control - LPHE_1 8.8 0.27 -1.5 0.46 5.0 0.53 -1.5 0.11 
HPHE- HPLE -4.9 0.62 4.2 0.32 2.0 0.84 4.2 0.62 
HPHE -LPHE_1 -26.3 0.00** 6.3 0.13 27.3 0.00*** 6.3 0.00*** 
HPLE - LPHE_1 -21.4 0.02** 2.0 0.77 25.3 0.00*** 2.0 0.01** 
         
         
Panel B: Experiment 2         
Control - Min_5 10.3 0.32 -9.5 0.03** -6.4 0.33 -3.7 0.26 
Control - Min_25 25.8 0.01** -7.4 0.11 -0.4 0.87 5.4 0.63 
LPHE_1 - Min_5 1.5 0.88 -8.0 0.07* -1.4 0.62 -10.4 0.11 
HPLE- Min_5 -19.9 0.08* -6.0 0.2 -26.6 0.03** -24.1 0.00** 
HPHE - Min_25 -9.3 0.37 0.4 0.96 -22.7 0.05* -17.2 0.00** 
LPHE_1 - LPHE_2 1.5 0.88 -2.6 0.07** -10.8 0.29 1.6 0.87 
Control - LPHE_2 10.3 0.96 -4.1 0.29 15.8 0.13 8.3 0.18 
Notes: All p-values based on Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 3: Models of Agent and Principal behaviour in both the Good (G) and Bad (B) states. 
 
(1) 
Truth, State G 
(2) 
Truth, State B 
(3) 
Follow Signal G 
(4) 
Follow Signal B 
Panel A: Coefficient Estimates    
HPHE 0.046 0.346*** 0.225** 0.134** 
 (0.033) (0.089) (0.091) (0.066) 
HPLE 0.054 0.306*** 0.201** -0.073 
 (0.040) (0.082) (0.088) (0.077) 
LPHE 0.013 0.088 -0.050 -0.075 
 (0.039) (0.074) (0.064) (0.058) 
Risk Averse Dummy -0.051 0.116 0.036 -0.088 
 (0.044) (0.086) (0.136) (0.097) 
Postgrad Dummy -0.060 0.134 -0.151 0.156 
 (0.038) (0.092) (0.129) (0.097) 
Female Dummy 0.053 0.122 0.155 -0.041 
 (0.038) (0.079) (0.095) (0.078) 
Trust in Stranger Dummy -0.036 0.005 -0.077 -0.000 
 (0.032) (0.080) (0.097) (0.080) 
Father Completed University 
Dummy 
-0.019 0.064 0.064 0.149 
 (0.031) (0.072) (0.129) (0.090) 
Mother Completed University 
Dummy 
-0.045 -0.032 0.070 -0.207** 
 (0.037) (0.066) (0.116) (0.091) 
Low Income Dummy -0.085** -0.248** -0.226* 0.085 
 (0.039) (0.095) (0.126) (0.107) 
Constant 1.147*** 0.218 0.579*** 0.668*** 
  (0.087) (0.164) (0.174) (0.168) 
Panel B: Difference Estimates 
   
Control – HPHE -0.05 -0.34*** -0.225** -0.13** 
Control – HPLE -0.05 -0.31*** -0.20** 0.07 
Control – LPHE -0.01 -0.08 0.05 0.08 
LPHE – HPHE -0.03 -0.26*** -0.275*** -0.20*** 
HPHE – HPLE -0.008 0.04 0.02 0.20** 
LPHE – HPLE -0.04 -0.22*** -0.25*** -0.001 
Observations 240 240 240 240 
  0.087 0.215 0.106 0.11 
Notes: Estimates from OLS regressions with standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in parentheses. 
            Dependent Variable: (1) Agent sending true message if state is G; (2) Agent sending true message if state 
            is B; (3) Principal following signal G; (4) Principal following signal B.  
            Panel A presents coefficients of OLS regressions. All regressions included session dummies. Panel B 
            uses post-estimation linear combination tests of hypotheses using t-tests. 
            *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
2R
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Figure 1: Game tree for the (i) control treatment with no punishment (Z = 0); and (ii) low 
penalty, high enforcement (LPHE) treatment which has a penalty Z = 5 with certainty. In this 
Figure B (G) refers to the Good (Bad) state of the world, F (NF) occurs when a Principal 
decides to follow (not follow) a signal, Z refers to the penalty, p is the likelihood the state of 
nature is bad and q is the likelihood the state of nature is good.  
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Figure 2: Game tree for uncertain punishment treatments. The high penalty, high enforcement 
(HPHE) treatment assumes a penalty Z = 50 and an enforcement probability α = 0.5. The high 
penalty, low enforcement (HPLE) treatment assumes the same penalty with an enforcement 
probability α = 0.1. In this Figure B (G) refers to the Good (Bad) state of the world, F (NF) 
occurs when a Principal decides to follow (not follow) a signal, Z refers to the penalty, p is the 
likelihood the state of nature is bad and q is the likelihood the state of nature is good.  
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Figure 3: Decomposition of the total deterrence effect due to norm salience and decreases in 
expected payoff for Agents and Principals.  
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Appendix A: Computations for Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
1. Mixed Strategy Equilibrium for Control Treatment 
As the Agent’s weakly dominant strategy is to choose G at 1G and the Principal knows that a 
signal of G implies 𝑃(State 𝐺|signal 𝐺) = 3/7, we obtain the probability the Agent sends a 
signal G at node 1B, denoted as x, by applying Bayes’ theorem as: 
 
𝑃(State 𝐺|Signal 𝐺) =
𝑃(Signal 𝐺|State 𝐺)𝑃(State 𝐺)
𝑃(Signal 𝐺|State 𝐺)𝑃(State 𝐺) + 𝑃(Signal 𝐺|State 𝐵)𝑃(State 𝐵)
 
 
⇒
3
7
 =
1
4
1
4 + 𝑥
3
4
 
 
⇒ 𝑥 =
4
3
(
7
12
−
3
12
) =
4
9
 
 
The Agent’s expected payoff for signalling G at 1B is 70𝑦 + 20(1 − 𝑦). Signalling B ensures 
a payoff of 30. Thus we have: 
 
70𝑦 + 20(1 − 𝑦) = 30 
 
⇒ 𝑦 =
1
5
 
 
2. Mixed Strategy Equilibirum when Expected value of punishment is 𝛼𝑍 
An Agent’s expected payoff for signalling G at 1B is now (70 − 𝛼𝑍)𝑦 + 20(1 − 𝑦), while 
signalling B still ensures payoff of 30. 
 
(70 − 𝛼𝑍)𝑦 + 20(1 − 𝑦) = 30 
 
⇒ 𝑦 =
10
50 − 𝛼𝑍
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Appendix B: Payoff Tables 
 
Table A1: Payoff from the Control Treatment 
State of the World P1 Signal P2 Choice Payoff P1 Payoff P2 
G (Probability: 
0.25) 
G 
F 70 70 
NF 30 30 
B 
NF 20 50 
F 30 30 
B (Probability: 
0.75) 
G 
F 70 0 
NF 20 30 
B 
NF 30 0 
F 30 30 
 
 
Table A2: Payoff from High Penalty Low Enforcement Treatment (HPLE) 
State of the 
World 
P1 Chooses to 
Message 
P2 Chooses to 
pick 
Payoff if not punished Payoff if punished 
Payoff P1 Payoff P2 
Payoff 
P1 
Payoff 
P2 
G (Probability: 
0.25) 
G 
F 70 70 70 70 
NF 30 30 30 30 
B 
NF 20 50 20 50 
F 30 30 -20 30 
B (Probability: 
0.75) 
G 
F 70 0 20 0 
NF 20 30 20 30 
B 
NF 30 0 30 0 
F 30 30 30 30 
Note: 10% probability of being punished 
 
 
Table A3: Payoff from High Penalty and High Enforcement Treatment (HPHE) 
State of the 
World 
P1 Chooses to 
Message 
P2 Chooses to 
pick 
Payoff if not punished Payoff if punished 
Payoff P1 Payoff P2 
Payoff 
P1 
Payoff 
P2 
G (Probability: 
0.25) 
G 
F 70 70 70 70 
NF 30 30 30 30 
B 
NF 20 50 20 50 
F 30 30 -20 30 
B (Probability: 
0.75) 
G 
F 70 0 20 0 
NF 20 30 20 30 
B 
NF 30 0 30 0 
F 30 30 30 30 
Note: 50% probability of being punished 
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Table A4: Payoff from Low Penalty High Enforcement Treatment (LPHE) 
State of the 
World 
P1 Chooses to 
Message 
P2 Chooses to 
pick 
Payoff 
Payoff 
P1 
Payoff 
P2 
G (Probability: 
0.25) 
G 
F 70 70 
NF 30 30 
B 
NF 20 50 
F 25 30 
B (Probability: 
0.75) 
G 
F 65 0 
NF 20 30 
B 
NF 30 0 
F 30 30 
Note: 100% probability of being punished 
 
 
 
 
Table A5: Payoff from Min-5 Treatment 
State of the 
World 
P1 Signal P2 Choice Payoff P1 Payoff P2 
G (Probability: 
0.25) 
G 
F 70 70 
NF 30 30 
B 
NF 20 50 
F 25 30 
B (Probability: 
0.75) 
G 
F 65 0 
NF 20 30 
B 
NF 30 0 
F 30 30 
 
 
 
 
Table A6: Payoff from Min-25 Treatment 
State of the 
World 
P1 Signal P2 Choice Payoff P1 Payoff P2 
G (Probability: 
0.25) 
G 
F 70 70 
NF 30 30 
B 
NF 20 50 
F 5 30 
B (Probability: 
0.75) 
G 
F 45 0 
NF 20 30 
B 
NF 30 0 
F 30 30 
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Table A7: Payoff Possibilities from the Risk Game; payoffs 
listed in experimental dollars. 
Option No. Heads Tails 
1 ED 28 ED 28 
2 ED 24 ED 36 
3 ED 20 ED 44 
4 ED 16 ED 52 
5 ED 12 ED 60 
6 ED 2 ED 70 
  
 
35 
Appendix C: Discussion of Agent behaviour when the state is G and 
Principal behaviour when they receive a signal B 
Results for Agent behaviour when the state of the world is G are presented in Table 1 and Table 
A8. As expected we find that deception is very low in state G, with very little difference across 
treatments. Overall, 230 out of 240 signals sent when the state of the world was G were true 
signals. This result is expected as deception is a weakly dominated strategy in this state. 
 
Turning next to Agent beliefs about the behaviour of Principals when they receive a B signal 
we find that Agent’s on average predicted that only 66% of Principals would follow a signal 
B. There is very little impact of our treatments on Agent beliefs that a Principal will follow a 
Signal B (p = 0.29, Kruskal-Wallis, two sided). Given the incentives, we would expect to see 
higher following rates among Principals and similarly high beliefs among Agents that 
Principals will follow such a signal. In the control, HPHE and HPLE treatments, beliefs about 
Principal following are always below the actual Principal’s following rate (p ≤ 0.02, Wilcoxon 
signed rank). However, beliefs about following rates are not statistically different from the 
actual following rate in the LPHE treatment (p = 0.13, Wilcoxon signed rank). 
 
Given that sending a signal B when the state of the world is G is a weakly dominated strategy 
for Agents and Principals are aware of payoffs, Principals should always follow a B signal. We 
find that, on average, only 77% of Principals in all treatments follow signal B. Following rates 
are highest in the HPHE treatment at 92% followed by 79% in the control and 71% in the LPHE 
or HPLE treatments, with following in the HPHE treatment statistically significantly higher 
than the HPLE and LPHE treatments (p = 0.02 and p < 0.01 respectively). However, overall 
these rates are not statistically significantly different across treatments (p = 0.28, Kruskal-
Wallis Test, two tailed).  
 
Principal’s beliefs about Agent truthfulness when the true state of the world is G is presented 
in Panel A of Table A8. On average, Principals believe that 31% of Agents send a deceptive 
signal, that is, they send signal B when the state of the world is G. This is far greater than the 
average actual deception rate of 4.2% (p < 0.01, Wilcoxon Signed-rank). In the control 
treatment, Principals believe that 34% of Agent signals will be deceptive when the state of the 
world is G. This is significantly higher than the expected rate of deception of 19% in the HPHE 
treatment (p = 0.01) and 22% in the LPHE treatment (p = 0.007). The highest actual following 
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rate for a signal G is 71% for the HPHE treatment, which corresponds to the most optimistic 
Principal beliefs about truthful reporting in the HPHE treatment of 81%. This provides support 
for the fact that Principal beliefs about deception will be greatest in the control treatment but 
is not consistent with the manner in which beliefs are expected to vary with punishment 
treatments. 
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Table A8: Treatment Differences for behaviour and beliefs of Agents when in the Good state and Principals upon receiving Bad signal 
Treatment Differences 
Deception at Good 
State 
Belief about following 
of Bad Signal 
Follow of Bad Signal 
Belief about Misreport 
when state is Good 
 Difference p-value Difference p-value Difference p-value Difference p-value 
Panel A: Experiment 1          
Control - HPHE 6.3 0.12 -5.5 0.15 -13.4 0.07* 14.8 0.01** 
Control - HPLE 3.9 0.35 -3.2 0.44 7.3 0.37 7.2 0.14 
Control - LPHE_1 1.3 0.73 -5.8 0.09* 7.5 0.27 11.4 0.00*** 
HPHE- HPLE -2.4 0.34 2.3 0.41 20.7 0.01** -7.6 0.49 
HPHE -LPHE_1 -5.0 0.16 -0.3 0.85 20.9 0.01** -3.3 0.97 
HPLE - LPHE_1 -2.6 0.49 -2.6 0.42 0.2 0.98 4.3 0.45 
         
         
Panel B: Experiment 2       
 
 
Control - Min_5 3.2 0.14 -2.38 0.76 -6.1  0.46  11.20 0.04** 
Control - Min_25 6.3 0.58 -0.98 0.59 3.1  0.73  14.68 0.00*** 
LPHE_1 - Min_5 2.0 0.65 3.41 0.33 -13.6  0.13  -0.25 0.93 
HPLE- Min_5 -0.7 0.86 0.81 0.83 -13.4  0.17  4.03 0.61 
HPHE - Min_25 0.0 1.00 4.53 0.45 16.4  0.06*  -0.11 0.64 
LPHE_1 - LPHE_2 -1.1 0.81 3.31 0.55 -13.6  0.12  7.08 0.11 
Control - LPHE_2 0.1 0.97 -2.48 0.50 -6.1 0.46 18.53 0.00*** 
Notes: All p-values based on Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test 
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Appendix D: Alternative tests of robustness 
Table A9: Robustness of all treatment differences across Agents and Principals. 
 Panel A: Agent 
 Action   Beliefs 
  Difference P (MWW) P (t-test)   Difference P (MWW) P (t-test) 
 State Good  Signal Bad 
Control - HPHE 6.3 0.12 0.12  -5.5 0.15 0.21 
Control - HPLE 3.9 0.35 0.35  -3.2 0.44 0.41 
Control - LPHE 1.3 0.73 0.73  -5.8 0.09* 0.07* 
HPHE - HPLE -2.4 0.34 0.34  2.3 0.41 0.61 
HPHE - LPHE -5 0.16 0.16  -0.3 0.85 0.94 
HPLE - LPHE -2.6 0.49 0.49  -2.6 0.42 0.46 
Control - Min_5 3.2 0.14 0.49  -2.8 0.76 0.57 
Control - Min_25 6.3 0.58 0.14  -1.0 0.59 0.83 
LPHE- Min_5 2 0.65 0.65  3.4 0.33 0.38 
HPLE -Min_5 -0.7 0.86 0.86  0.8 0.83 0.84 
HPHE - Min_25 0 1.00 1.00  4.5 0.45 0.42 
 State Bad  Signal Good 
Control - HPHE 35.1 0.00*** 0.00***  -7.8 0.06* 0.08* 
Control - HPLE 30.2 0.00*** 0.00***  -3.5 0.33 0.39 
Control - LPHE 8.8 0.27 0.27  -1.5 0.46 0.66 
HPHE - HPLE -4.9 0.62 0.63  4.2 0.32 0.41 
HPHE - LPHE -26.3 0.00** 0.00**  6.3 0.13 0.15 
HPLE - LPHE -21.4 0.02** 0.02**  2 0.77 0.61 
Control - Min_5 10.3 0.32 0.32  -9.5 0.03** 0.03** 
Control - Min_25 25.8 0.01** 0.01**  -7.4 0.11 0.12 
LPHE- Min_5 1.5 0.88 0.88  -8 0.07* 0.07* 
HPLE -Min_5 -19.9 0.08* 0.07*  -6 0.2 0.23 
HPHE - Min_25 -9.3 0.37 0.37  0.4 0.96 0.95 
 Panel B: Principal 
 Signal Good  State Bad 
Control - HPHE -22.3 0.02** 0.02**  -7.8 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Control - HPLE -20.3 0.03** 0.03**  -3.5 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Control - LPHE 5 0.53 0.53  -1.5 0.11 0.11 
HPHE - HPLE 2 0.84 0.85  4.2 0.62 0.71 
HPHE - LPHE 27.3 0.00*** 0.00***  6.3 0.00*** 0.00*** 
HPLE - LPHE 25.3 0.00*** 0.00***  2 0.01** 0.01** 
Control - Min_5 -6.4 0.33 0.54  -3.7 0.63 0.46 
Control - Min_25 -0.4 0.87 0.98  5.4 0.26 0.29 
LPHE- Min_5 -1.4 0.62 0.89  -10.4 0.11 0.06* 
HPLE -Min_5 -26.6 0.03** 0.02**  -24.1 0.00** 0.00** 
HPHE - Min_25 -22.7 0.05* 0.05*  -17.2 0.00** 0.00** 
 Signal Bad  State Good 
Control - HPHE -13.4 0.07* 0.07*  14.8 0.01** 0.00*** 
Control - HPLE 7.3 0.36 0.37  7.2 0.14 0.17 
Control - LPHE 7.5 0.27 0.28  11.4 0.00*** 0.00*** 
HPHE - HPLE 20.7 0.01** 0.02**  -7.6 0.49 0.13 
HPHE - LPHE 20.9 0.01** 0.01**  -3.3 0.97 0.42 
HPLE - LPHE 0.2 0.98 0.98  4.3 0.45 0.36 
Control - Min_5 -6.1 0.46 0.46  11.2 0.04** 0.05** 
Control - Min_25 3.1 0.73 0.73  14.68 0.00*** 0.00*** 
LPHE- Min_5 -13.6 0.13 0.13  -0.25 0.93 0.95 
HPLE -Min_5 -13.4 0.17 0.17  4.03 0.61 0.49 
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HPHE - Min_25 16.4  0.06*  0.06*   -0.11 0.64 0.98 
Note: P (MWW) implies p-value from two tailed Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, while P (t-test) is p-value 
from two tailed t-test 
 
